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 The “Peter Pan Syndrome” in Emerging Markets: 
The Productivity-Transparency Tradeoff in IT Adoption  
 
Abstract 
Firms make investments in technology to increase productivity. But in emerging markets, 
where a culture of informality is widespread, information technology (IT) investments leading to 
greater transparency can impose a cost through higher taxes and need for regulatory compliance.  
This tendency of firms to avoid productivity-enhancing technologies and remain small to avoid 
transparency has been dubbed the “Peter Pan Syndrome.” We examine whether firms make the 
tradeoff between productivity and transparency by examining IT adoption in the Indian retail 
sector.  We find that computer technology adoption is lower when firms have motivations to 
avoid transparency. Specifically, technology adoption is lower when there is greater corruption, 
but higher when there is better enforcement and auditing. So firms have a higher productivity 
gain threshold to adopt computers in corrupt business environments with patchy and variable 
enforcement of the tax laws. Not accounting for this motivation to hide from the formal sector 
underestimates productivity gains from computer adoption. Thus in addition to their direct 
effects on the economy, enforcement, auditing and corruption can have indirect effects through 
their negative impact on adoption of productivity enhancing technologies that also increase 








For many businesses in emerging markets, information technology (IT) is a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, IT systems can help improve productivity and thus help firms gain a 
competitive advantage. But the same systems that improve productivity also increase 
transparency of transactions by leaving a clear audit trail. Such increased transparency makes it 
easier for the government to collect taxes and enforce regulatory compliance by bringing these 
transactions into the formal sector of the market, potentially increasing the cost of operations, 
relative to those who do not use IT systems. In emerging markets, where enforcement is patchy 
and corruption is rampant, firms who keep much of their transactions in the informal sector can 
therefore gain a competitive advantage.
1
 In such settings, the gains in productivity from adoption 
of IT are moderated by the attendant costs of making the transactions subject to taxation and 
regulatory compliance (Bird and Zolt 2008; Johnson et al. 2000; Mishra, Subramanian and 
Topalova 2008; Sinha 2003). At the margin, firms may therefore limit investments in IT, to the 
detriment of overall productivity, especially if their beliefs about the relative magnitude of 
productivity gains versus transparency costs are underestimated (Gatti and Honoratti 2008; 
Smith 2013). This tendency of firms in emerging markets to shun growth and remain small at the 
expense of efficiency, technology adoption and innovativeness to avoid taxes and regulatory 
scrutiny has been dubbed the “Peter Pan Syndrome.”
2
 Sunder (2012) summarizes the dilemma in 
the context of domestic Indian retailers’ reluctance to modernize through IT systems: “The 
system that serves to manage large retail organizations is also convenient for tax payment and 
collection…Indian retailers can and should break out of the self-defeating confines of the beliefs 
about the profitability of tax evasion.”  
There is some intuitive appeal to the conjecture that transparency concerns might impede 
IT adoption among emerging market retailers; however the conjecture has not received empirical 
scrutiny. Just as important, the productivity enhancing benefits of IT adoption in emerging 
                                                 
1
 The informal or grey economy is here defined as trade, services or production, that is noncompliant in any 
aspect(s) of company registration, tax declaration/payment, business regulation (e.g., employer’s national insurance, 
public/employer’s liability insurance), and/or licensing requirements for the specific trade (e.g., health and safety 
certificate). 
2
 In an article titled “The Peter Pan Syndrome,” the Economist (May 17, 2014) states: “Manuel Milano of the 
Mexican Competitiveness Institute, a think-tank, calls this a “Peter Pan System” in which firms prefer to stay small 
than to grow, mostly because of tax and regulation. “It is easier to fly under the radar when you are microscopic.” 
“The article goes on to discuss the large opportunity costs of firms for remaining small—higher interest rates from 
banks, lack of efficiency, technology and innovation. 
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markets cannot be taken for granted. For example, it is possible that given the low cost of labor 
and the lack of complementary infrastructures, the gains through productivity enhancement from 
IT adoption by retailers in emerging markets may not be sufficiently high to warrant IT adoption. 
For IT to help improve productivity, the business ecosystem and organization should be able take 
advantage of the technology. For example, in the absence of supply chain and cold chain 
infrastructure in emerging markets, the value of computers for efficient supply chain 
management may be quite limited. Similarly, when a retailer’s employees are older and 
untrained and unfamiliar with using IT systems, installing IT systems will not lead to 
productivity gains. This is a particularly relevant concern, given that even within an advanced 
high-income economy such as the United States there was much academic debate till the mid-
nineties on whether IT in fact improves productivity.  
For instance, much of early research on IT productivity claimed a “IT-productivity 
paradox” in that it was not possible to reject the hypothesis that computers add nothing to total 
output (e.g., Loveman 1994), or found that the marginal costs exceeded marginal benefits 
(Morrison and Berndt 1990).
3
 It was not until Brynjolffsson and Hitt (1996) showed through 
detailed firm-level survey data that dollar for dollar, spending on computer capital created more 
value than spending on other types of capital that the tide began to turn and researchers were able 
to demonstrate that IT does increase productivity. The literature discusses two reasons for the 
divergence of the results. First, the results reporting insignificant effects were from an older 
period in the seventies when IT productivity might indeed have been lower. Second, as discussed 
in the examples earlier, complementary infrastructure and the organizational redesign necessary 
to exploit IT may not have been present (Commander, Harrison & Menezes-Filho 2011). As 
complementary infrastructures may be inadequate and firms could still be in the low productivity 
part of the experience curve in emerging markets, the conjecture that IT improves productivity in 
an emerging market deserves systematic empirical scrutiny. 
Our goal in this paper is to therefore empirically answer three questions about the use of 
IT by businesses in emerging markets: First, do operational transparency concerns impede IT 
adoption by businesses? Second, does IT adoption have a positive impact on productivity and 
how much? Importantly, the magnitude of the impact may be underestimated at the margin, if 
                                                 
3
 Robert Solow, the Nobel Prize winning economist characterized the IT productivity paradox thus: “we see 
computers everywhere except the productivity statistics.” 
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firms with potentially high productivity gains do not adopt computers due to transparency 
concerns that impede IT adoption. Third, we seek to understand how this tradeoff varies by size 
of firms. Do transparency concerns reduce IT adoption among smaller or larger firms? Do larger 
firms gain more in productivity than smaller firms through IT adoption? We answer these 
questions using detailed firm-level survey data on 1948 retail firms covering a broad cross-
section of states and cities in India. In addition, we use several other sources to augment this firm 
level survey data with state level data in terms of a number of relevant variables like corruption 
level, minimum wages rate, and overall socio-economic development indices.  
India presents an ideal setting to study these questions. First, the retail sector is at an early 
stage of modernization, labor is still relatively cheap, the complementary infrastructures are still 
not fully available; and hence the productivity gains from IT adoption is a priori ambiguous, 
requiring systematic empirical analysis. Specifically, the minimum wages and literacy levels 
vary across states, giving us state level variation on the labor-saving productivity benefits of 
using computers. Second, with high level of corruption in India, the transparency concerns are 
especially acute as India scores a poor 36 (out of 100) in the Transparency International (2012) 
report and ranks at 94 out of 176 countries. Further, given India’s federal system of government 
where states have significant power, there is considerable variation in the levels of corruption, 
enforcement and auditing across different states in India. These variations are valuable in 
identifying the empirical link between IT adoption and transparency motivations. To address the 
concern as to whether the link between IT adoption and transparency levels across states are not 
merely due to another unobserved factor that varies across states and is correlated with 
transparency and technology adoption, we perform a falsification test. Specifically, we tested the 
link between generator adoption and transparency variables, as transparency concerns should not 
affect generator adoption. We find that consistent with our hypotheses, unlike IT adoption, 
generator adoption is not linked to transparency related factors.  
Further, in evaluating the effect of IT adoption on productivity, there are obvious 
selection concerns because business computer adoption is not random. We assess selection 
concerns using two approaches. First, we use propensity score matching to ensure that inferences 
of productivity differences between adopters and non-adopters are between firms that are 
“comparable” in their propensity to adopt. We also test for potential “selection on 
unobservables” using a Rosenbaum bounds approach to assess whether unobservable factors 
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relating to computer adoption might drive the positive estimates of productivity effects. Second, 
we estimate a model of self-selection using transparency variables as instruments. Variations in 
corruption and enforcement levels across states and across firms, serve as exclusion restrictions 
in that they impact computer adoption by firms, but does not directly impact their revenues. 
Our key findings are as follows: (1) At the margin, higher corruption levels are related to 
lower computer adoption. (2) Better regulation enforcement increases computer adoption 
because it creates a level playing field across firms, reducing transparency concerns. (3) 
Generators do increase productivity, but as one would expect, their adoption is not affected by 
transparency concerns. (4) Computer adoption increases store productivity on average by about 
50 to 70 percent. The effects of transparency on computer adoption and the impact of computer 
adoption on productivity are both greater for larger than for smaller firms. (5) Not taking into 
account the endogenous effects of transparency related variables on computer adoption 
underestimates the productivity gains from IT adoption, suggesting that productivity estimates in 
emerging markets with non-transparent environments should account for such concerns. 
Our results have obvious implications for policy makers, as they show that corruption and 
lax enforcement of tax laws can not only lead to direct losses in tax revenues, but also indirect 
losses due to productivity drop from reduced adoption of productivity enhancing systems that 
increase transparency. From a marketer perspective, our results show that transparency concerns 
will reduce market sizes of productivity-enhancing products that also increase transparency (e.g., 
computers, cash registers which maintain records in memory, and credit card machines). Further, 
they suggest that marketers should use variables measuring corruption, enforcement levels and 
audit mechanisms as predictors for market potentials for such products.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the 
Indian retail sector, issues of informal sector in emerging markets and the literature on IT 
productivity. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis and the  
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
 We position this paper against two streams of literature: the IT- productivity relationship 
and the culture of informality in emerging markets. Finally, we discuss why the Indian retail 




2.1 IT Adoption and Productivity 
As discussed in the introduction, the link between IT adoption and productivity was the 
subject of much controversy in the eighties and early nineties.  Early analysis using firm level 
data from 1978-82 did not find evidence of productivity increases (Loveman 1994; Barua et al. 
1995). It is possible that productivity gains were not large in the early stages of IT adoption; 
others have argued that the inability to detect productivity gains could be due to aggregation and 
measurement bias (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Stiroh 2004). This “productivity paradox” was 
resolved through analysis of later data during the 1987-92 period by Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(1996). Since then a number of studies have found strong and positive association between IT 
adoption and productivity (e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw & Prennushi 1997; Black & Lynch 2001; 
Bartel et al. 2002; Bartel, Ichniowski & Shaw 2005). At the same time, the magnitude of IT 
productivity gains is found to vary significantly across countries, with estimates for European 
economies far lower than for the US (Basu et al 2003; Jorgenson 2001; Stiroh 2002). It is well 
recognized that one needs complementary logistics, supportive regulatory environments for the 
effective use of IT within a national economy (Commander et al. 2011). Emerging markets may 
lack these complementary logistics and regulatory environments, potentially limiting 
productivity gain from IT. Often organizations need to be redesigned to support IT; as 
organization redesign lags IT adoption, the benefits of IT adoption may not be immediately seen.  
As for the link between firm size and productivity gains from IT, it is theoretically 
unclear. While larger firms have more complex coordination needs that can aid greater 
productivity gains (Dasgupta et al. 1999),  smaller firms may be more flexible to take better 
advantage of IT (Morgan et al. 2006). Not surprisingly, empirical results also remain mixed 
though most papers report a positive relationship (e.g., Delone 1981; Fabiani et al. 2005; Morgan 
et al. 2006; Thong 1999); while some report insignificant (e.g., Lefebvre et al. 2005; Love et al. 
2005) and negative relationships (e.g., Dewett and Jones 2001; Harris and Katz 1991). 
 
2.2 Culture of Informality 
A culture of informality – where firms keep business outputs hidden or opaque from the 
formal system of monitoring and thus avoid being subject to government taxation and regulation 
– varies across economies (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein & Inchauste 2008). The share of informal 
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business activities is estimated at between 10% and 20% of GNP for developed countries; it 
ranges from 33% to 50% for developing countries (Schneider and Enste 2002).  It is important to 
recognize that the practice is not limited to firms in the informal sector only, especially in 
emerging markets. A report by McKinsey Global Institute (Farrell 2004) notes:  “The informal 
economy is not just the unregistered street vendors and tiny businesses that form the backbone of 
marketplaces in Asia and other emerging markets. It includes many established companies, often 
employing hundreds of people, in industries as diverse as retail, construction, consumer 
electronics, software, pharmaceuticals and even steel production."  
Firms prefer informality as it helps them avoid taxes and costly regulation; unilaterally 
avoiding taxes becomes a competitive advantage when firms are unlikely to be caught and 
punished. For example, when corruption is high or enforcement is patchy, tax avoidance is 
feasible through paying bribes. Further, by keeping tax-related operational activities informal 
and avoid transparency enhancing technologies, they can reduce the level of “electronic trail” 
government officials can have in demanding bribes
4
 (Mishra et al. 2008; Russell 2010). 
Unfortunately, the culture of informality leads to a vicious cycle of further tax avoidance and 
drive to informality as governments are forced to increase tax rates from the smaller set of 
compliant firms which incentivizes them further to become non-compliant  (e.g., Azuma and 
Grossman 2002; Dabla-Norris et al. 2008; Marcouiller and Young 1995). In contrast, when the 
enforcement environment is excellent and there are auditing mechanisms to ensure that such tax 
avoidance is harder, firms are less likely to be in the informal sector and less motivated to avoid 
transparency enhancing technologies. This is because computers provide productivity enhancing 
benefits, but do not put the firm at a competitive disadvantage because better enforcement 
ensures that all players are on a level playing field.  
There is also face validity that business computerization increases operational 
transparency and helps better enforcement by creating easily detectable “digital traces” of 
taxable business activities through a transparent record keeping system (Friedman et al. 2000; 
International Tax Compact 2010; Russell 2010). For example, the governments of Bangladesh 
                                                 
4
 Miller and Tucker (2014) find that U.S. hospitals are one-third less likely to adopt “electronic medical records” 
(EMR) systems in those states that allow search and use of electronic records in ligation cases, even though EMR 
systems enhance operational productivity and cost efficiency. Their results suggest that even in developed countries 
like the United States, transparency concerns can reduce IT adoption. 
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(The Daily Star 2007), China (People’s Daily 2000) and Ethiopia (Mesfin 2012) have recently 




2.3 Choice of Setting: Indian Retail Sector 
The Indian retail sector is the fifth largest in the world with a current market size of about 
US$ 500 billion and average growth rates of between 8-10%. Yet, the Indian retail sector lags 
behind those of peer emerging markets like China when it comes to adoption of modern 
management technologies and IT systems to help and guide retail business practices (Reardon & 
Gulati 2008; Sunder 2012). The retail sector in India thus offers an ideal setting for studying the 
productivity-transparency tradeoff. It is often argued that the sector is well positioned to gain in 
productivity from IT adoption through improvement in inventory management, pricing and 
customer relationship management (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 2002; Sunder 2012). Yet, 
the low rate of IT adoption could be because the Indian environment is not conducive to 
productivity gains from adoption. For example, lack of complementary infrastructures (e.g., 
logistics and supply chain, road infrastructure) may reduce the productivity gain from IT 
adoption.  Or low labor costs may reduce the gains from IT adoption.  
Also, transparency concerns are quite real in India with an endemic national “culture” of 
corruption. Transparency International (TI) found that more than half of those surveyed had 
firsthand experience of paying bribe or peddling influence to get a job done in a public office, 
and it ranked India 94 among 176 countries for lack of transparency (TI 2012). India tops the 
worldwide list for “black money” with almost $1,456 billion stashed in Swiss banks (Nayar 
2011; Rao 2010); an amount 13 times the country's total external debt. The popular press is 
replete with articles that note how “tax evasion is a national sport” for both businesses and 
individuals (Chopra 2011; Dhara & Thomas 2011). Understanding the relative importance of 
productivity and transparency in the low rate of computer adoption can be a critical aid to policy 
prescriptions on how to improve productivity in one of the world’s largest retail markets.  
 
3. Data 
We collated the data necessary for the analysis from multiple sources. We first discuss 
the sources and then provide descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical analyses.  
                                                 
5
 The People’s Daily of China (2000) reported: “China has stepped up its efforts to fight against tax evasion by 




3.1 Data Sources 
Our primary data source for this study is a large scale World Bank survey of Indian 
retailers conducted in 2006. As part of its private sector development project and research 
initiatives, the World Bank conducts regular surveys of individual firms in many developing 
countries. Such firm level surveys are used to guide internal bank policies, but have also been 
occasionally used to address academic research questions in economics and finance (e.g., 
Angelini & Generale 2008; Cull & Xu 2005). In particular, Amin (2010) uses the data from this 
particular survey to study the effect of labor regulations on computer adoption. 
The survey consists of a stratified random sample of 1948 retail stores operating in the 
formal sector and located in 16 major states and federal territories across 41 Indian cities. The 
National Industrial Classification groups Indian retailers into those operating through registered 
stores and the rest who usually operate informally from home (NIC 1998, Industry Division 52). 
All stores in our sample belong to the former group. 
The sampling was carried out with a first level stratification of three segments by retail 
store type: (i) traditional stores - which include general and departmental stores, grocers, 
chemists, food stores, etc., (ii) consumer durable stores - which are specialized stores carrying 
durable items like televisions, home appliances, etc., (iii) modern format stores - which are large 
stores and part of a shopping complex. These three store types account for 64%, 26% and 10% of 
the sample, respectively. Within each store type segment, a secondary stratification was based on 
operation size. The overall sample size was determined so as to minimize the standard error in 
the sample variables, given the available resources for each surveying stratum.  
The survey was conducted by the Indian unit of a reputed international market research 
firm and involved personal interviews with store managers. The store managers were told that 
the goal of the survey was to gather opinions about the investment climate for the retail sector in 
the country. They were also told that the information obtained will be held in the strictest 
confidentiality; neither their names nor the names of their businesses would be used in any 
document based on the survey. The survey collected information on a variety of store 
characteristics such as annual sales, key operational costs, employment, availability of 
infrastructure, access to finance, etc. It also reports on the store manager’s perceptions about 
various aspects of the business climate including competition and corruption culture.  
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We augment this store level survey data from the World Bank with relevant state level 
data from other sources. Specifically, the state level corruption index is obtained from the ‘Indian 
Corruption Study’ that was undertaken by Transparency International (TI) and released in 
October of 2005. It is one of the largest corruption surveys ever conducted, with a total of 14,405 
respondents; spread over 151 cities and 306 rural areas within 20 Indian states. We also collected 
data from Indian government sources on three other state level variables to capture state level 
differences that can affect IT adoption. One is labor cost, as computers and electronic cash 
registers can replace (1) competent and experienced accounting and stock-keeping staff who use 
traditional manual account keeping books, and (2) experienced and trusted cashiers who are 
competent in mental computations to total up bills and produce change. So, higher labor costs 
make automation through computers to increase productivity more appealing (Amin 2010).We 
operationalize labor costs through the minimum wage rates in the retail services sector across 
states set under the Shops and Establishments Act (SEA) of India. We use data from the 2001 
report of India’s Labor Bureau as it is the closest year to our World Bank survey year (2006) for 
which the data was available for all the states in our sample. Though this differs from the actual 
wages in 2006, we believe that the relative values are likely to be quite comparable. 
  Another state level variable on which we collect data is the adult literacy rate as a proxy 
for relative education level differences across states. In states with a less educated workforce, it 
would be harder to find employees who can use computers effectively, therefore leading to lower 
adoption. A less educated public may also tolerate more corruption. We use the average of the 
states’ adult literacy rates from the 2001 and 2011 census data by Indian government. The 
average is likely to be close to the 2006 literacy level. Finally, we use Human Development 
Index (HDI) to capture differences in socio-economic development across states, as lower 
development can inhibit technology adoption as well as foster corruption. As these two state 
level variables impact both corruption and IT adoption, it is important to control for these 
variables in isolating the direct effect of corruption and other transparency metrics on adoption. 
We obtain the HDI data for our sample states from the India Human Development Report 2011 
(Govt. of India 2011), which computes the index values based on 2007-08 national survey data. 
The HDI for a state is a composite relative indicator of socio-economic development stage for 




3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analyses.
 6
 We 
measure store performance through gross revenue generated at the store in the latest fiscal year, 
normalized for “size” of the retailer in terms of employees and store area. Specifically our 
performance metrics are gross annual revenue per employee (labor productivity) and gross 
annual revenue per sq. feet (floor area productivity).
7
 For our sample stores, mean gross revenues 
are Rs. 1.90 million, while revenues net of operational costs are Rs. 1.62 million. The median 
gross revenues is Rs. 0.50 million; for firms at or below the median, the average revenues is Rs. 
0.22 million; while for firms above the median, the average revenues is Rs. 3.79 million. With 
respect to our measure of labor productivity, the mean and median values are Rs. 0.55 
million/employee and Rs.0.25 million/employee respectively. For the floor area productivity 
measure, the mean and median values are Rs. 7450/sq. ft. and Rs. 3330/sq. ft. respectively. 
We consider the adoption of two productivity enhancing technologies by each retail store 
in our sample: business computer and in-store electricity generator. Only 17% of the stores have 
business computer systems; but 30% own a generator, while 27% own an in-store security 
system. This suggests that lack of computer adoption may not be entirely due to financial 
constraints. With 83% of stores facing power outages in the previous year, perhaps greater 
generator adoption might be optimal. It also reflects the tremendous loss of efficiency and 
wasted capital in emerging markets, where lack of infrastructure (power) necessitates what might 
be otherwise wasteful investment in in-store generators. 
We consider both state level and firm level perceptions of corruption as it is an 
“experiential” phenomenon that occurs out of public glare. Hence even though perceptions of 
corruption by individual firms within a state will be correlated to the aggregate state level index, 
it will also vary across firms due to firms’ differential experiences in the context of their business 
operations. For example, the officials in local regulatory offices who deal with a particular firm 
are likely to be different in their “corruption propensity.” Similarly, the peer group of firms -- 
                                                 
6
 Additional background information, in terms of the rationale for their inclusion and operationalization, for some of 
the variables are available in the online appendix.  
7
 In addition, since the World Bank survey collected data on some key annual operational costs – viz., labor, 
electricity, communication services and rent or loan payment on land/building, equipment and furniture, we also 
tested the robustness of our results for productivity measures based on gross revenues  net of those costs for the 
latest fiscal year. The key results are qualitatively identical and are available in the online appendix. 
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whose actual and/or perceived operational practices shape the perception of a particular firm 
about corruption prevalence -- will differ across firms, even within the same geography. 
The data shows that the stores operate in business environments that vary quite a bit in 
terms of corruption related factors expected to discourage operational transparency, as well as in 
terms of regulatory enforcement related factors expected to encourage transparency. For the 
states included in the World Bank survey, the values of the TI corruption index (measured on a 
1-10 scale) range from a low of 2.40 (Kerala) to a high of 6.95 (Bihar). Other variables also vary 
significantly across the sample states. For instance, the minimum wages rate varies from a low of 
Rs. 42.50 to a high of Rs. 99.70 with an average value of Rs. 72.38. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show 
the sample distribution of adoption level of computers by store type and state respectively. While 
the overall adoption level is low at 16.8%, there is significant variation across both store type and 
state. Figure 3 shows our primary explanatory variables for why computer adoption varies by (1) 
enforcement and (2) corruption across the 16 states in our sample. There is substantial variation 
across states in terms of enforcement and corruption. 
In terms of store-specific characteristics, the average number of employees in a store is 
about 6, but there is substantial standard deviation around the mean. The median number of 
employees is 2; for firms at or below the median number, the average number of employees is 
1.3; while for firms with above the median number of employees, the average number of 
employees is 12. The average store size is about 600 sq. ft., but here also there is a large standard 
deviation around the mean. The median size is 150 sq. ft.; for firms at or below the median, the 
average size is 90 sq. ft; while for firms above the median, the average size is 1167 sq. ft. The 
average age of the store is 12 years; here the standard deviation is less than the mean, and the 
mean and median are roughly the same unlike in size and number of employees.  
The average experience of the store manager is 13 years. Most stores are owned by single 
owners with the mean value of the share of the store owned by its largest owner is about 96%. As 
expected, only 1% of stores are owned by the government, given that retailing is almost virtually 
a private sector activity, except for fair price shops meant to distribute staple groceries to the 
poor. Stores vary in their level of access to formal financing. About 36% of stores do not have 
bank accounts; while 78% do not have access to overdraft facilities—suggesting credit 
constraints are significant. Stores keep about 12 days of inventory for their main selling products. 
  [Insert Table 1 about here] 
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[Insert Figures 1 -3 about here] 
4. Empirical Analyses  
We begin with bivariate descriptive analyses to obtain a graphic sense of the nature of 
relationships among the key variables of interest. We then follow this with relevant statistical 
analyses that control for other variables that can impact the outcome variables. We also account 
for potential endogeneity concerns in estimating the productivity impact of computer adoption, 
as computer adoption is an endogenous variable. 
 
4.1 Bivariate Relationships 
We first report the relationship between computer adoption levels and transparency and 
enforcement. Figures 4 and 5 show the state-level scatter plots of computer adoption levels with 
corruption and regulatory inspection levels. The correlation between computer adoption and 
corruption levels is -0.53, consistent with the premise that higher the overall culture of 
corruption, higher will be the propensity towards business tax evasion and thus lower the 
incentive to adopt transparency enhancing business computer technology. Similarly, the 
correlation of 0.24 between adoption and inspection level is consistent with the premise that 
higher the regulatory enforcement, lower will be the propensity towards business tax evasion and 
higher the incentive to adopt transparency enhancing computer technology.
8
 
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
 
 We further test whether the overall correlations reported above hold within more specific 
sub-groups. First we do a median split of states by the level of corruption and test whether 
computer adoption is lower in states with higher corruption levels. We also check if the 
relationship holds within sub-groups of retailers (traditional, modern and durables). The results 
are reported in Figure 6. We find that the computer adoption rate is lower by 5% to 12% in 
higher corruption states. Interestingly, the gap is larger among modern stores; suggesting that it 
is modern retailers who are being most strategic about transparency concerns when adopting 
computers. Figure 7 shows a similar graph for computer adoption rates as a function of 
enforcement levels. The gap is larger here; states with better enforcement have 30% to 40% 
                                                 
8
 Kerala (KL) and Bihar (BR) appear to be outliers in Figure 4. We therefore assessed the robustness of our results 
by dropping Kerala and Bihar from the states included in the analysis. All of the reported relationships in the paper 
continue to hold and the key results without the outlier observations are available in the online appendix. 
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higher adoption rates. Clearly, one has to control for other variables to quantify the effect of 
transparency and enforcement on computer adoption; but there is prima facie evidence here that 
higher enforcement and better governance are correlated with lower transparency concerns. 
 We also assessed the transparency concern by using another variable that indicates the 
competitive disadvantage issue of tax evasion. We use store managers’ perceptions of the level 
of dishonesty among their peers in terms of hiding revenues for tax evasion. Figure 8 reports 
how computer adoption varies among different store types, based on the managers’ perception of 
perceived dishonesty among peers. For all store types, managers who have not adopted 
computers in their stores believe that there is a higher level of tax evasion in the industry.  
[Insert Figures 6-8 about here] 
 
Finally, Figure 9 reports the relationship between productivity and computer adoption 
using our two productivity metrics: the revenues per employee (labor productivity) and revenues 
per sq. ft. (floor area productivity). The graphs show that productivity is higher for stores that 
adopt computers. Obviously, other variables need to be controlled for and there are potential 
selection concerns, which we now address in the subsequent statistical analyses. 
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
4.2 Computer Adoption 
We begin by discussing the findings from the probit computer adoption regression. The 
first set of results is for the full sample. The first column excludes gross annual revenues, while 
the second column includes it. The results in both columns are consistent with our hypotheses 
about transparency variables: corruption, enforcement/audits and regulatory consistency. The 
corruption variables are negatively related to adoption, while enforcement/audits and regulatory 
consistency are positively related to adoption. Thus the primary hypothesis of the paper—that 
computer adoption is systematically correlated with transparency concerns is supported. 
As expected, higher labor costs are positively related to computer adoption as firms 
substitute technology for labor. Computer adoption is positively related to generator adoption, 
suggesting positive correlation in preferences for productivity enhancing technologies. Further, 
as expected from a cost affordability perspective, computer adoption is positively correlated with 
a store’s gross annual revenues.
9
 In terms of control variables such as state literacy rates (or 
                                                 
9
 As we report in Section 4.4, gross annual revenues have a reverse causal link to computer adoption through the 





 other store and management characteristics, they generally have the right sign. Higher 
literacy rates (or HDI) are correlated with greater computer adoption. Larger stores are more 
likely to adopt computers. Interestingly, older stores and managers with greater experience are 
less likely to adopt computers; suggesting (not surprisingly) that experience is negatively related 
to new technology adoption. The negative relationship with experience potentially captures the 
relative lack of comfort of older managers with computers. We revisit the net effect of 
managerial experience on productivity later based on our self-selection model estimation results 
in Section 4.6. Finally, we find that ownership characteristics (concentration or government 
ownership) are not related to computer adoption. Also, interestingly the power supply related 
factors do not have a significant relationship, suggesting that generators and power back up 
equipment are perhaps being used as appropriate to address power supply problems. 
 We conclude this section by assessing the heterogeneity in the effect of transparency 
concerns by firm size. We use a median split of firms by size and estimate the probit model of 
computer adoption separately for large and small firms. The direction of the estimates is 
qualitatively identical across firm size for all variables. However, the differences in magnitudes 
of the effects for small and large firms show that corruption and enforcement concerns 
systematically have larger impact on larger firm’s adoption decisions than on smaller firms.
11
 
Specifically, corruption suppresses computer adoption more among larger firms, while 
enforcement increases computer adoption among larger firms. This suggests that the losses from 
corruption and the gains from enforcement are greater for larger firms. External auditors have a 
higher positive relationship with computer adoption among small firms relative to large firms. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.3 Falsification Check: Generator Adoption 
                                                                                                                                                             
variables. In Section 4.6, we estimate the gross annual revenue and computer adoption equations as a simultaneous 
equations model accounting for self-selection with appropriate exclusion restrictions, where we control for the 
endogeneity of the revenue and computer adoption variables. Our results in Table 8 remain robust. 
10
 The correlation between literacy rate and HDI in our sample of 16 Indian states is high at .85. The high correlation 
is not surprising as education (proxied by literacy rate) is one of the three dimensions for HDI. Literacy rate is also 
strongly correlated with income per capita and life expectancy—the proxies for the other two dimensions, viz., 
economic development and health. To avoid multicollinearity, we use literacy rate and HDI separately in the 
regression analysis, but not together. The results are qualitatively identical. To conserve space, we present only the 
results using the literacy rate in the paper.  
11
 Rather than estimate the probit separately for smaller and larger firms, one could have estimated a pooled 
regression with interaction terms between the relevant variables with a large or small firm dummy. This would have 
highlighted whether the differences are significant, but would not have given us a direct estimate of the effect for 
small and large firms. We estimated the pooled regression with interactions and all differences that we discuss here 
are indeed significant. 
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One interesting possibility is whether there are some unobserved characteristics which 
are correlated with transparency concerns that might drive productivity enhancing technology 
adoption. For example, states that have high corruption might systematically cause non-adoption 
of productivity enhancing technologies for reasons that might not be associated with 
transparency concerns. To address this issue, we conduct a falsification check. We choose a 
technology like generator, whose adoption increases productivity, but is not connected to 
transparency and test whether its adoption is linked to transparency concerns. Further, to assess 
face validity, we include literacy rate in the regression which is shown to impact computer 
adoption, but should not directly impact generator adoption. The results of the generator 
adoption regression for the full sample, and the large and small firms are presented in Table 3.  
The falsification check is validated. The transparency variables i.e., corruption, 
enforcement and regulatory consistency become insignificant for generator adoption both in the 
aggregate as well as for small and large firms separately. On the other hand, the electric power 
related factors turn out highly significant; larger stores are more likely to use generators.  One 
possibility is that electricity infrastructure is worse in less developed areas; in that sense the 
electric power factors might be capturing some other elements of transparency we have not 
considered.  However, state literacy rate is insignificant as literacy is not required for generator 
adoption. Overall, this rules out the possibility that literacy, corruption/enforcement and electric 
power factors are all proxies for an unobservable development variable that might commonly 
affect all types of technology (computer and generator) adoption, and also productivity. This 
gives us greater faith in the transparency mechanism affecting computer adoption.  
Further, it should be noted that some transparency related variables included in the 
regression are at the firm level, obtained through the survey (e.g., perceived informality by peers, 
external audit, etc.), while others are at the state level (e.g., TI corruption index, regulatory 
consistency). Neither the state level nor firm-specific transparency measures are significant in 
the generator adoption equation though they were significant in computer adoption. As 
transparency metrics at the state level are potentially correlated with other omitted factors such 
as lower levels of development and less-established infrastructure in the state, it is gratifying that 
not only the state, but also firm specific (local) transparency factors are both not significant.
12
 
                                                 
12
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the importance of finding insignificant relationships not only at 
the state but also at the firm (local) level. As an additional robustness check, we also ran the probit regression of 
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 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.4 Impact of Computer Adoption on Productivity 
We next report the results of the productivity regressions. We start with OLS regressions. 
Table 4a and Table 4b report the results of regression for labor productivity (revenue/employee) 
and floor area productivity (revenue/square foot). For each productivity variable, we report the 
results for the full sample and for large and small firms.
13
 We begin with the results for the full 
sample. Productivity is higher among firms adopting computers as reflected by the positive 
coefficient on computer. Given that the dependent variable enters the regression equation in logs, 
the productivity multiplier on revenue per employee for firms adopting computers is 25% (exp 
(0.224) = 1.25), while on revenue per square foot is 29% (exp(0.259)). 
The other variables in the regression have the expected signs for both metrics of 
productivity. Firms that adopt generators have higher productivity. Larger stores are more 
productive. Interestingly, manager experience is positively related to store productivity. Thus 
even though experience is negatively related to computer adoption and thus may be associated 
with lower productivity due to lack of computer adoption, the direct relationship between 
managerial experience and productivity is positive. However, concentrated ownership is 
negatively related to productivity, perhaps reflecting the fact that much of single ownership is 
driven by subsistence stores. In terms of store characteristics, having access to banking and 
financing is positively correlated with greater productivity. Use of in-store security is also 
positively correlated with productivity, as theft is widely considered a serious drain in retailing. 
We have included a number of controls that are potentially correlated with transparency 
variables to rule out spurious relationships between transparency variables and productivity. Yet 
it is possible that there are other potentially omitted variables that could be correlated with the 
transparency variables, and have their own direct effect on computer adoption, but not on 
generator adoption. An example of such a variable is literacy rate. Demands from an educated 
workforce potentially reduce corruption and increases enforcement; which can increase computer 
adoption, but not generator adoption. We therefore estimate the model including literacy rate in 
                                                                                                                                                             
generator adoption with state level fixed effects by including only the firm level variables but excluding all the state 
level variables. The results are qualitatively identical to those in Table 3 for all the firm level variables in terms of 
their statistical significance levels and directionality; they are available in the online appendix. See Table 8b for the 
simultaneous equations MLE results on computer adoption with state fixed effects. 
13
 Our analysis indicated statistically significant heterogeneity in gains from computer adoption by firm size, but not 
across other firm characteristics. Hence we focus only on large and small firm differences in the rest of the paper. 
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the productivity and computer/generator adoption regression. Literacy rates are significant in the 
computer adoption and productivity equation, but not in the generator adoption regression as 
noted earlier.
14
  The fact that productivity enhancing effects of computers remain significant 
even after controlling for the effects of moderating variables such as literacy (or HDI) that are 
correlated not only with computer adoption and productivity, but also correlated with 
transparency variables, lends confidence to the conclusion. 
[Insert Table 4a and Table 4b about here] 
As before, we report the results of the productivity regressions for large and small firms 
based on a median split. The direction of the estimates is qualitatively identical for both large 
and small firms as in the full sample estimates for both labor and floor area productivity metrics. 
Comparing the results by firm size, larger firms gain more in terms of labor productivity from 
computer adoption (29% i.e., exp(0.253)) relative to smaller firms (24%). The corresponding 
numbers for floor area productivity are 28% and 24% respectively. Thus our results are 
consistent with the notion that productivity gains are larger for larger stores that require greater 
coordination. The other variables in the regressions have the same signs as before. 
 
4.5 Propensity Score Matching 
 One concern with the OLS estimates on the effect of computers on productivity is that 
stores that adopt computers are systematically different from stores that do not affect computer 
adoption and therefore differences in productivity across the two groups may not be due to 
computer adoption. Matching methods, pioneered by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and refined 
by Heckman and colleagues (e.g., Heckman et al. 1998; Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997, 
1998), have been developed such that the outcomes of the treated (computer adopters) denoted 
by 1Y  are contrasted only against the outcomes of “comparable” untreated (non-adopters) 
denoted by 0Y  so that productivity differences can be attributed to the treatment (computer 
adoption). The basic idea of the matching method is discussed below.  
Let 0I  and 1I denote the set of indices for non-treated and treated respectively. To 
estimate a treatment effect for each treated firm 1i I , outcome 1iY  is compared against the 
average of outcomes 0 jY  for all matched firms 0j I among the untreated firms. Matches are 
                                                 
14
 The results are qualitatively identical when HDI is included in the regression in place of literacy rate. 
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based on observed characteristics that affect treatment (in our case, the variables that impact 
computer adoption as reported in Table 2). When the observed characteristics of the untreated 
firm is closer to that of the treated firm, based on an appropriate distance metric, that untreated 
firm gets a greater weight when constructing the match. Thus the estimated gain for each firm i 
in the treated sample 1I  is
0
1 0( , )
p
i jj I S
Y W i j Y

 , where pS  is the set of firms in the region 
of common support across the treated and non-treated i.e., 
Supp( | 1) Supp( | 0)pS X D X D     and ( , )W i j  is an algorithm-specific weight based on 
the distance between the propensity scores for i and j. Let 1n  be the number of treated cases; the 
focal parameter of interest called the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), reflecting the 









j I S j I S






   
Specifically, we use kernel matching advocated in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) 
for constructing the weighting function based on the difference in propensity scores between 
firm i and j.  Specifically the weighting function is given by: 
0
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where G(.) is the kernel function, jP is the propensity score of firm j, and h is a tuning parameter 
that specifies a bandwidth for the kernel function. Specifically, we report results based the 
Epanechnikov kernel 2( ) 0.75(1 ) (| | 1)G u u I u    (see Leuven and Sianesi 2003). The kernel has 
a parabolic shape with support in the region [-1, 1].
15
 We estimate the model using the 
PSMATCH2 module in Stata.  
To perform propensity score matching (PSM), a critical requirement is the ability to 
match treated observations with non-treated observations through propensity scores. For this, a 
rich set of variables that can reasonably discriminate the treated and non-treated observations is 
necessary. Specifically, we estimate the propensity scores through probit analysis of computer 
                                                 
15
 We also estimated the effect using other matching methods such as nearest neighbor matching based on both 
propensity scores (Leuven & Sianesi 2003) as well as actor norm based “distances” between treated and control 
units (Abadie, Drukker, Herr and  Imbens 2004). Our results are similar in magnitude across the different methods. 
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adoption using the same set of observed covariates that we report in the probit regressions of 
Table 2. Given missing data on different covariates, we have a sample size of 1501 with 324 
treated and 1,177 non-treated cases. The probit model provides a good fit with the data with an 
adjusted 2R of 0.52. Given the requirements of common support for the estimated propensity 
scores between treated and non-treated firms, the propensity matching involves a sample of 
1,199 with 269 treated and 930 non-treated units. The region of common support is [.004, .999] 
and the mean propensity score for computer adopters is 0.58. Table 5 shows the distribution of 
the estimated propensity scores and the mean values of selected (and representative of key 
dimensions) variables used in propensity score matching for the treated and non-treated units by 
distinct block grouping.
16
 The block grouping ensures that within each block (PS interval), the 
mean values of estimated propensity scores are very comparable between treated and non-treated 
units. The number of blocks, here 13, is generated by enforcing that condition using the 
algorithm by Becker and Ichino (2002) based on repeated splitting of each blocks starting with 5 
equal interval initial blocks till the comparable condition is achieved. As expected, there are 
more untreated firms in the low propensity score blocks, while there are more treated firms in the 
high propensity score blocks, suggesting that the variables included for propensity matching does 
indeed help discriminate the firms on computer adoption.  
Table 6 reports the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) based 
on both labor productivity and size productivity measures. We first report the results for the full 
sample. We find that computer adoption enhances labor productivity by about 51% (ATT value 
of 0.409) and floor productivity by 70% (ATT value of 0.528). Clearly, the OLS results 
substantially underestimate the productivity increase from computer adoption. Similarly, the 
ATT for large and small firms reported also show that OLS estimates are substantially biased 
downwards. Overall, the qualitative insights that larger firms gain more in productivity from 
computer adoption continue to hold. 
So, why are the OLS estimates on the increase in productivity due to computer adoption 
biased downwards? At the margin, factors affecting computer adoption (including transparency) 
raises the threshold of productivity required for computer adoption. If we do not control for these 
factors, then the threshold for productivity required for computer adoption would be lower. 
                                                 
16
 The results for all the variables used in our analyses are given in the online appendix. 
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Therefore the OLS estimates that do not account for the factors affecting adoption have a 
downward bias in productivity increases.  
[Insert Tables 5-6 about here] 
Selection on Unobservables: Rosenbaum Bounds 
Within the propensity score matching framework, sensitivity to potential selection on 
unobservables (hidden selection not captured in the observable variables used in propensity score 
matching) is assessed using Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum 2002; DiPrete and Gangl 2004). 
The basic idea is to assess how much of the variance in unobservables needs to drive selection to 
negate the treatment effect; the higher the variance needed, the more confident we are that the 
qualitative results about the role of computer adoption are robust.  
Table 7 shows the level of unobserved variance necessary to make the productivity 
enhancing effects of computers insignificant due to unobserved selection. The treatment effect 
becomes insignificant when  > 1.9 for the labor productivity measure and at about  > 2.2 for 
the floor productivity measure. In this context, the mean propensity score for computer adopters 
in our study is 0.58. Since our findings of the treatment effect on the labor productivity measure 
remain robust to unobserved selection effects till about  = 1.9, it indicates that unobserved 
selection bias will undermine our finding of the positive productivity impact of computer 
adoption if the mean propensity of computer adopters increase from 0.58 to 0.58x1.9 = 1.1. 
Similarly, since our findings of the treatment effect on the floor productivity measure remain 
robust to unobserved selection effects till about  = 2.2, it indicates that unobserved selection 
bias will undermine our finding of the positive productivity impact of computer adoption if the 
mean propensity of computer adopters increase from 0.58 to 0.58x2.2 = 1.3. Since it is highly 
unlikely that the probability of computer adopters will jump from 58% (based on observables 
alone) to 110% or 130% (including unobservable effects), our PSM based findings on the 
positive productivity impact of computer adoption are reasonably robust to hidden selection bias 
giving us faith in the finding that computer adoption indeed enhances productivity. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects  
We next explore heterogeneous treatment effects across firms. We use the Matched 
Smoothing Method of Estimating Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (MS-HTE) described in 
Brand and Xie (2010) and Xie, Brand and Jann (2011). The propensity score matching results 
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reported the Average Treatment effect for the Treated (ATT). As reported earlier, for labor 
productivity, the ATT is .409; therefore computer adoption enhances labor productivity for the 
treated by 51%. The Average Treatment effect for the Untreated (ATU) is .605; therefore 
computer adoption enhances labor productivity for the untreated by 83%. The Average 
Treatment Effect (across Treated and Untreated) is 0.561; therefore computer adoption enhances 
labor productivity on average by 75%. However there is heterogeneity in these effects. 
The scatter plots of the estimated treatment effects against the propensity scores for the 
treated and the untreated are presented in Figure 10. A regression curve fitted on these scatter 
plots show that overall there is a decline in treatment effects for both treated and untreated 
groups with increase in propensity scores. However the slope is relatively flat and insignificant 
for the treated, while significantly negative for the untreated. More important, we find that when 
propensity scores are low, the productivity increases for untreated firms is greater than the 
productivity increases for treated firms. But when propensity scores are high, the productivity 
increases for untreated firms is lower than the productivity increases for treated firms. This is 
consistent with the argument we made earlier that at the margin, factors affecting computer 
adoption (including transparency) raise the threshold of productivity required for computer 
adoption. Thus the productivity increases for the untreated is higher when the propensity scores 
are lower—despite potentially high gains in productivity, other factors reduce the propensity to 
adopt computers. However when such impediments to adoption are lower (as when the 
propensity score is higher), the productivity increases for treated firms are higher. On average, as 
there are far more untreated firms, and they tend to be at the low end of the propensity score 
spectrum, we find that ATU > ATT. 
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
4.6. Modeling Self-Selection 
With Rosenbaum bounds, we considered selection on unobservables, as if the selection is 
random. But if selection is non-random as is the case with computer adoption, one has to model 
self-selection. To address this concern, we next estimate the effect of computer adoption on firm 
productivity using Heckman’s model of self-selection.
17
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 The propensity score matching literature argues that the Rosenbabum bounds approach does not require normal 
distribution assumptions and is non-parametric, unlike the bivariate normal Heckman selection model. Another 
advantage is that the Heckman selection model requires exclusion restrictions involving instruments—variables than 
impact selection, but not outcomes-which may not always be available. Further, these estimates are not the average 
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Let iy  denote the outcome, i.e., productivity of firm i and ix  be factors that impact 
productivity. Let iw  be the self-selected choice of firm i to adopt computers and iz  denote factors 
that affect the decision of firm i to adopt computers. Let 
*
iw  be a latent variable indicating the 
incremental value obtained by firm i, by adopting computers and 
*1 if 0 and 0 otherwisei i iw w w   . The Heckman self-selection model is described by the 
following two equations, the outcome and selection equations, respectively. 
 i i i iy x w       
 
*
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. 
 The bivariate normal model above can be estimated by Heckman’s two step estimation 
approach or maximum likelihood (Maddala 1983). We estimate the model using maximum 
likelihood. We note that revenue is an endogenous variable in the computer adoption equation, 
and computer adoption is an endogenous variable in the revenue equation. As there are many 
exogenous variables, that are only present in either the revenue or the computer adoption 
equation and not both, the system is identified.  
We report the estimation results in Table 8. While Table 8a reports the results of labor 
productivity equation, Table 8b reports the results of the computer adoption selection equation. 
Table 8c reports the results of the floor area productivity equation. We suppress the results of the 
computer adoption selection equation corresponding to floor area productivity as these results are 
virtually identical to Table 8b. We run each of the self-selection models in Tables 8a-c with and 
without the state level fixed effects. The models with state level fixed effects include only the 
firm level variables but exclude all the state level variables, and allow us to rule out any kind of 
potential state level unobservables. As comparison of the results across the columns in Tables 
8a-c show, they remain virtually identical with or without controlling for the state level fixed 
                                                                                                                                                             
treatment effect across all firms, but a local average treatment effect (LATE) over the firms whose decision to adopt 
computers are affected by the instruments. When selection on unobservables is not random, and exclusion 





 Also, the signs of the variables in productivity equations in Table 8 remain essentially 
the same as in the OLS results reported in Table 4. However, considerable bias exists in the OLS 
estimates of computer adoption on productivity. Importantly, the correlation between the 
outcome and selection term is negative and significant with values between -0.42 to -0.53 across 
the different models, suggesting the importance of unobserved selection.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Using the full sample self-selection model for labor productivity, we elaborate on the 
estimated average marginal effects of a few variables of interest that indirectly impact 
productivity through their effect on computer adoption.
19
 For example, an external auditor for a 
retailer is related to 6.98% higher probability of computer adoption, which in turn translates to a 
24.11% higher labor productivity based on simultaneous estimation of productivity and selection 
model. Similarly a standard deviation increase in the “regulatory inspections” and “regulatory 
consistency” variables is related to a 9.20% and 5.02% higher probability of computer adoption, 
which in turn translate to 11.75% and 4.57% higher labor productivity. Finally, we consider 
managerial experience that affects both computer adoption and productivity. The main effect of 
managerial experience on store productivity is positive; but the moderating effect of managerial 
experience on productivity through computer adoption is negative. The net effect of a standard 
deviation increase in managerial experience on productivity is higher by 17.84%, after 
accounting for the negative effect on computer adoption.  
To facilitate comparison across the different estimation approaches, the estimated effects 
of computer adoption on productivity using OLS, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and the 
Self-Selection Model (SSM) are reported in Table 9.  The estimates using SSM are close to those 
from the PSM but substantially greater than those from the OLS. To be specific, in terms of labor 
productivity, while OLS estimates a 25% improvement, PSM estimates a 50% improvement and 
the SSM estimates a 60% improvement on the treated firms. The heterogeneous treatment effects 
model estimates the average treatment effect on the untreated as 83% and the average treatment 
effect across treated and untreated is 75%.  Across all the results, it is clear that that not 
accounting for transparency leads to significant underestimation of the productivity improvement 
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 To conserve space, we have reported here the results of self-selection models with state fixed effects only for the 
full sample. The corresponding results by store size are qualitatively identical and are available in the online 
appendix. 
19
 We use the margins command in Stata to compute the average marginal effects reported. 
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from computer adoption. The results are directionally and substantively consistent for floor area 
productivity and also across small and large firms.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
The tendency of firms to avoid productivity enhancing technologies and remain small due 
to transparency concerns has been dubbed the “Peter Pan Syndrome” in emerging markets.  
Though IT enhances productivity, the “culture of informality” in emerging markets causes 
businesses to fear IT because they remove the “veil of secrecy” around business practices that is 
conducive for tax evasion. This paper investigated whether emerging market firms make the 
tradeoff between productivity and transparency in adopting IT.  
Specifically, the paper studied the productivity-transparency tradeoff in the Indian retail 
sector using data from a large scale national survey of 1948 Indian retailers augmented with 
other relevant data on corruption, enforcement and other state level control variables. We find 
that IT adoption is significantly affected by transparency concerns. While corruption reduces IT 
adoption, enforcement and auditing increases IT adoption by providing all firms a level playing 
field and reducing the negative impact of corruption. IT adoption increases store productivity on 
an average by about 50 to 70 percent. The effects of transparency on IT adoption and the impact 
of adoption on productivity are both greater for larger than for smaller firms. At the margin, 
higher corruption and lower enforcement raises the threshold of productivity required for IT 
adoption.  
Our results are relevant to transparency enhancing IT businesses, governments and policy 
makers. As growth in the developed world stagnates, firms are increasingly reliant on emerging 
markets for their growth. To the extent that the market potential for IT among businesses is 
linked to the extent to which they enhance productivity, our results show that corruption and 
enforcement levels in a market impact not only unit sales, but also the willingness to pay (and 
therefore the price) in emerging markets. For governments and policy makers, our results suggest 
that forceful enforcement and corruption reduction can not only have a direct positive impact on 
tax collection, but also an indirect positive impact on the tax revenue base. The latter impact 
occurs through greater productivity induced by the use of modern efficiency enhancing 
technologies and by bringing more businesses into the transparent formal sector. Our work 
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shows that modeling institutional characteristics of emerging markets can enhance the relevance 
of academic research for managers and policy makers in these markets.  
We conclude with a discussion of the limitations of the paper that provide possibilities for 
future research. First, the India findings need to be replicated in other emerging markets. Second, 
the results are based on a cross-sectional data set. We used a variety of statistical tools to make 
appropriate inference using cross-sectional data - e.g., propensity score matching, heterogeneous 
treatment effects and instrumental variable methods that account for self-selection to measure the 
productivity effects of IT. We assessed whether the effects of transparency on IT adoption are 
robust through a falsification test and allowing for state level fixed effects to account for other 
potential omitted state level factors that may drive IT adoption. Future research should replicate 
our key findings with panel data that ideally have some form of experimental or quasi-
experimental variation in transparency due to changes in policy or regulations.  
Even though we did not find significant heterogeneity in gains from computer adoption 
beyond firm size, it would be useful in future research to explore firm characteristics that can 
drive differences in gains from computer adoption. Finally, we modeled computer adoption as a 
discrete variable in assessing productivity. Future research should focus on assessing the effect 
of IT spending rather than of merely IT adoption as a discrete variable. It would also be of 
interest to understand how investments in IT can impact retail prices as IT lowers marginal costs, 
but also increases fixed costs. We hope that our study, serves as a stimulant for further academic 
research on these important research questions. 
In conclusion, we note that given the strong gains in productivity from IT adoption, we 
agree – albeit partly – with Sunder (2012) that “Indian retailers can and should break out of the 
self-defeating confines of the beliefs about the profitability of tax evasion” thus avoiding the 
“informality trap of lower productivity.” But curing the Peter Pan Syndrome among Indian 
retailers would require the government to improve the business environment to be free from 
corruption, and enhance the level and consistency of enforcement. As India opens up its markets 
to multinational, multi-brand retail, the need to increase productivity becomes even greater for 
domestic retailer survival. We hope our work encourages greater investment in productivity 
enhancing technologies by Indian retailers, as they prepare themselves for new levels of 
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Figure 2: Adoption level of business computers by state 
 
 
AP- Andhra Pradesh; BR-Bihar; DL-Delhi; GJ-Gujarat; HR-Haryana; JH-Jharkand;  
KA-Karnataka ; KL-Kerala; MP-Madhya Pradesh; MH-Maharashtra; OR-Orissa; PB-Punjab 










































































































































































































































Figure 9: Productivity of stores by computer adoption status 
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Figure 10: Heterogeneity in treatment effects 
 
y = -0.1646x + 0.5013 
R² = 0.0018 
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 Description N Mean SD 
Store level performance measures 
   Gross revenue generated – latest financial year (Rs. in million) 1918 1.900 4.081 
Revenue net of operational costs – latest financial year (Rs. in million) 1849 1.619 3.105 
    Productivity enhancing technology adoptions 
   Business computer (0= No; 1 = Yes) 1948 0.167 0.373 
In-store electricity generator (0= No; 1 =Yes) 1948 0.296 0.456 
    
Corruption factors discouraging transparency 
   Self-assessment of % of revenue typically reported by peers for tax purposes 1669 58.148 39.040 
Self-assessment of % of revenue typically used to bribe regulatory agencies 1808 0.835 2.366 
Transparency International (TI) Corruption Index at the state level (1-10)
2
 1948 4.811 0.769 
    Enforcement factors encouraging transparency 
   Number of times the store was inspected last year by state regulatory agencies 1948 1.512 3.580 
Store has an external auditor (0= No; 1 = Yes) 1914 0.302 0.459 
Perceived consistency in state’s regulatory implementations (1=Low; 6=High) 1948 3.096 0.608 
    
Other state level variables 
   Labor cost in terms of minimum wages rate (Rs.)
3
  1948 73.383 13.421 
Literacy rate (percentage)
4
 1948 72.922 8.335 
Human Development Index (0-1)
5
 1948 0.509 0.095 
    
Electricity power supply related factors 
   Faced power outage over the last year (0=No; 1 = Yes) 1944 0.829 0.377 
State’s power supply as a perceived obstacle to business  (0= No; 4=Severe) 1948 1.635 0.468 
    
37 
 
Table 1 (Contd.): Summary Statistics of the Analysis Variables    
Description N Mean SD 
Store size and age characteristics 
   Floor area of the store (sq. ft.) 1938 599.811 3553.710 
Number of full time employees at the store 1948 5.722 24.557 
Age of the store (years) 1948 14.478 12.796 
    
Store management and ownership characteristics 
   Experience of the store manager (years) 1948 12.948 9.803 
Ownership concentration (% of store owned by the largest owner) 1948 96.073 16.056 
Government owned store (0= No; 1 = Yes) 1948 0.011 0.103 
    Store finance, in-store security and competitive factors 
   Business bank account (0= No; 1 = Yes) 1940 0.639 0.481 
Overdraft facility   (0= No; 1 = Yes) 1921 0.223 0.416 
In-store security system (0= No; 1 = Yes) 1947 0.266 0.442 
Perceived level of price competition (0= Low; 1 = High) 1901 0.376 0.484 
Inventory level maintained for the main product (days) 1948 11.582 16.167 
 
1
 Unless specifically noted, the data source for a variable is the World Bank 2006 survey of Indian retailers. 
2
 Data source: "India Corruption Study 2005," Transparency International, Centre for Media Studies, India. 
3
 Data source: “Report on the Working on the Minimum Wages Act of 1948 for the Year 2001,” Labor Bureau, Government of India. Accessed at  
 http://www.labourbureau.nic.in/MW2K1%20Main%20Page.htm 
4
 Data source: Average of the states’ adult literacy rates from the 2001 and 2011 census data, Government of India. 
5







Table 2: Business Computer Adoption - Probit Regression 
 
All Stores-I All Stores-II Larger Stores Smaller Stores 
Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Corruption factors discouraging transparency         
State TI Corruption Index -0.169** 0.076 -0.172** 0.083 -0.179** 0.085 -0.127** 0.061 
Percent revenue spent on bribe -0.020** 0.009 -0.026** 0.011 -0.026** 0.012 -0.017** 0.008 
Perceived informality by peers -0.003* 0.002 -0.003* 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 -0.003* 0.002 
Enforcement factors encouraging transparency         
Regulatory inspections 0.033** 0.014 0.034** 0.015 0.038** 0.017 0.024** 0.010 
External auditor 0.321** 0.139 0.293** 0.119 0.246** 0.106 0.448** 0.202 
State’s regulatory consistency 0.026** 0.012 0.028** 0.013 0.027** 0.012 0.026** 0.012 
Labor cost and education level         
State minimum wages 0.041* 0.021 0.032* 0.017 0.038* 0.020 0.009* 0.005 
State literacy rate 0.076** 0.036 0.071** 0.033 0.074** 0.035 0.062** 0.031 
Electric power supply related factors         
Power outage -0.058 0.091 -0.051 0.094 -0.055 0.101 -0.052 0.094 
State power supply problem -0.067 0.072 -0.076 0.078 -0.077 0.073 -0.070 0.072 
Productivity enhancing technology adoptions         
Generator 0.529** 0.254 0.508*** 0.152 0.609*** 0.152 0.541* 0.281 
Store level performance measure         
Gross annual revenue -- -- 0.064*** 0.022 0.062*** 0.021 0.119** 0.056 
Store characteristics         
Store size 0.312*** 0.103 0.313*** 0.098 0.225** 0.105 0.411*** 0.142 
Employee size 0.387*** 0.088 0.401*** 0.108 0.406*** 0.106 0.293*** 0.087 
Store age -0.185** 0.091 -0.186** 0.093 -0.222** 0.109 -0.182** 0.091 
Store management & ownership characteristics         
Manager experience -0.162** 0.078 -0.156** 0.073 -0.153** 0.071 -0.125** 0.058 
Ownership concentration -0.008 0.006 -0.005 0.005 -0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.008 
Government owned -0.274 0.469 -0.268 0.379 -0.269 0.385 -0.177 1.959 
Fixed effects: Store Type and City Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1501 1501 734 767 
Model statistics LL= -355.59 LL= -342.23 LL= -362.78 LL= -260.69 
  Chi2 = 441.36 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 446.78 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 467.43 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 300.26 (p =0.00) 




Table 3: Electricity Generator Adoption - Probit Regression 
 
All Stores Larger Stores Smaller Stores 
Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Corruption factors discouraging 
transparency 
      State TI Corruption Index -0.080 0.094 -0.124 0.113 -0.044 0.218 
Percentage revenue spent on bribe -0.013 0.018 -0.031 0.028 -0.027 0.029 
Perceived informality by peers 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 
Enforcement factors encouraging 
transparency 
      Regulatory inspections 0.026 0.031 0.009 0.022 0.075 0.083 
External auditor 0.245 0.172 0.139 0.153 0.472 0.516 
State’s egulatory consistency 0.011 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.018 
Labor cost and education level       
State minimum wages -0.021 0.094 -0.026 0.113 -0.019 0.087 
State literacy rate 0.043 0.034 0.045 0.039 0.040 0.035 
Electric power supply related factors 
      Power outage 1.568*** 0.289 1.801*** 0.344 1.417*** 0.476 
State power supply problem 0.728** 0.286 1.042** 0.433 0.586** 0.251 
Productivity enhancing technology 
adoptions 
      Computer 0.518*** 0.141 0.662*** 0.162 0.287*** 0.110 
Store level performance measure 
      Gross annual revenue 0.068*** 0.018 0.069*** 0.022 0.127*** 0.046 
Store characteristics 
      Store size 0.306*** 0.070 0.275** 0.119 0.350** 0.164 
Employee size 0.368*** 0.075 0.441*** 0.105 0.357*** 0.133 
Store age -0.081 0.080 -0.004 0.108 -0.277 0.132 
Store management & ownership 
characteristics 
      Manager experience 0.266*** 0.077 0.261*** 0.103 0.339*** 0.126 
Ownership concentration 0.005* 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.007 
Government owned -0.254 0.465 -0.765 0.523 -0.378 0.313 
Fixed effects 
      Store type and City Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1501 734 767 
Model statistics LL= - 512.63 LL= - 294.97 LL= - 230.14 
  Chi2 = 481.5 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 368.2 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 274.2 (p =0.00) 





Table 4a:  Labor Productivity - OLS Regression 
 
 
All Stores Larger Stores Smaller Stores 
Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Productivity enhancing technology adoptions 
      Computer 0.224** 0.097 0.253*** 0.094 0.216** 0.093 
Generator 0.244*** 0.080 0.233** 0.097 0.267*** 0.079 
Store characteristics 
      Store size 0.011** 0.005 0.012*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003 
Store age -0.049 0.048 -0.085 0.070 -0.064 0.050 
Store management & ownership characteristics 
      Manager experience 0.113** 0.046 0.220*** 0.065 0.098** 0.040 
Ownership concentration -0.003* 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 -0.006** 0.003 
Government owned 0.600 0.461 0.735 0.561 0.236 0.738 
Finance, in-store security and competitive factors 
      Bank account 0.316*** 0.072 0.305** 0.124 0.319** 0.139 
Overdraft facility 0.179** 0.080 0.189** 0.085 0.174** 0.077 
In-store security 0.189** 0.076 0.209** 0.105 0.185** 0.085 
Price competition level 0.095 0.065 0.125 0.097 0.036 0.083 
Inventory level for main product 0.006*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.002 
State level educational factor       
Literacy rate 0.022** 0.011 0.019* 0.010 0.021** 0.009 
Fixed effects 
      
Store type and City Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1501 734 767 
Model statistics LL= - 2682.1 LL= - 1291.4 LL= - 1280.1 
  F-stat = 10.9 (p =0.00) F-stat = 5.3 (p =0.00) F-stat = 5.6 (p =0.00) 




Table 4b:  Floor Area Productivity - OLS Regression 
 
 
All Stores Larger Stores Smaller Stores 
Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Productivity enhancing technology adoptions 
      Computer 0.259** 0.106 0.266*** 0.101 0.247** 0.102 
Generator 0.213** 0.086 0.209** 0.086 0.220*** 0.081 
Store characteristics       
Store size -0.057 0.047 -0.059** 0.027 -0.056** 0.026 
Store age 0.082** 0.052 0.108** 0.055 0.078** 0.039 
Store management & ownership characteristics       
Manager experience 0.093* 0.050 0.123** 0.057 0.087** 0.039 
Ownership concentration -0.003 0.002 -0.005* 0.003 -0.003 0.002 
Government owned 0.492 0.316 0.532 0.348 0.382 0.285 
Finance, in-store security and competitive factors       
Bank account 0.298*** 0.078 0.348*** 0.090 0.288*** 0.077 
Overdraft facility 0.223*** 0.086 0.242*** 0.092 0.221*** 0.082 
In-store security 0.228*** 0.082 0.245*** 0.090 0.213*** 0.076 
Price competition level 0.104 0.070 0.094 0.069 0.108 0.078 
Inventory level for main product 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.001 0.003 0.003 
State level educational factor       
Literacy rate 0.026** 0.012 0.027** 0.013 0.025** 0.012 
Fixed effects       
Store type and City Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1503 734 769 
Model statistics LL= - 2607.8 LL= - 1680.9 LL= - 1342.4 
  F-stat = 10.4 (p =0.00) F-stat = 6.06 (p =0.00) F-stat = 6.36 (p =0.00) 

















Number of sample 
observations 













Store size (sq. ft.) 
Managerial 
experience (yrs.) 
1 0.000 4 328 0.442; 0.461 3.237; 3.097 1.603; 1.568 0.625; 0.597 128.50; 142.00 11.00; 11.37 
2 0.025 6 132 0.985; 1.004 3.133; 3.076 1.516; 1.619 0.925; 0.792 199.67; 182.08 11.83; 11.52 
3 0.050 8 134 0.939; 0.980 3.129; 3.102 1.572; 1.641 1.229; 1.090 208.75; 217.23 11.75; 13.05 
4 0.100 33 135 1.012; 1.019 3.124; 3.116 1.545; 1.610 1.741; 1.592 269.73; 247.90 12.61; 12.81 
5 0.200 5 59 0.874; 0.815 2.900; 3.091 1.802; 1.601 1.840; 1.589 280.40; 318.10 13.80; 13.22 
6 0.250 11 33 1.708; 1.663 3.108; 3.186 1.524; 1.615 2.564; 2.235 321.82; 332.88 13.27; 13.73 
7 0.300 18 33 1.585; 1.630 2.991; 3.208 1.546; 1.644 4.706; 4.962 424.72; 411.39 14.22; 13.21 
8 0.400 7 23 0.947; 0.996 3.236; 3.100 1.616; 1.732 6.357; 5.966 379.71; 331.74 10.14; 11.70 
9 0.450 17 10 2.276; 2.295 2.823; 2.911 1.446; 1.536 5.956; 5.827 636.59; 611.00 14.94; 14.20 
10 0.500 20 17 1.034; 0.932 2.968; 3.203 1.481; 1.659 5.150; 4.986 611.80; 583.53 14.45; 14.00 
11 0.600 21 13 1.133; 1.112 3.115; 3.166 1.517; 1.364 5.426; 5.512 707.62; 705.38 12.24; 12.85 
12 0.700 35 9 0.955; 0.867 3.144; 3.239 1.459; 1.604 5.533; 5.609 840.86; 912.11 11.51; 12.44 
13 0.800 84 4 1.028; 0.946 3.141; 3.069 1.465; 1.358 7.489; 7.750 5596.01; 5250.00 13.50; 13.25 
a
 The region of common support is [0.004, 0.999]. 
b














All Stores 0.409*** 0.142 
   
Log of 
Floor area productivity 
All Stores 0.528*** 0.187 
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*** p < .01; ** p < .05 
 
1 
All estimates are based on bias-corrected matching estimators using kernel (Epanechnikov) matching approach 





Table 7: Robustness to Unobserved Selection Effects: Rosenbaum Bound Analyses 
For Log of Labor Productivity
1
 
Gamma () p-Value 
2
 H-L Point Estimate 
3
 Conf. Interval 
2
 
  (U-Bound) (L-Bound) (U-Bound) (L-Bound) (U-Bound) (L-Bound) 
1.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.4502 0.4502 0.3163 0.5713 
1.1 0.0000 0.0000 0.4068 0.4886 0.2751 0.6141 
1.2 0.0000 0.0000 0.3688 0.5240 0.2371 0.6519 
1.3 0.0001 0.0000 0.3329 0.5570 0.2036 0.6844 
1.4 0.0001 0.0000 0.3017 0.5902 0.1720 0.7150 
1.5 0.0001 0.0000 0.2718 0.6195 0.1426 0.7429 
1.6 0.0001 0.0000 0.2458 0.6468 0.1133 0.7688 
1.7 0.0006 0.0000 0.2211 0.6700 0.0839 0.7948 
1.8 0.0099 0.0000 0.1975 0.6922 0.0582 0.8182 
1.9 0.0263 0.0000 0.1742 0.7133 0.0327 0.8391 
2.0 0.0581 0.0000 0.1527 0.7333 0.0100 0.8601 
2.1 0.1103 0.0000 0.1307 0.7526 -0.0102 0.8797 
2.2 0.1847 0.0000 0.1097 0.7717 -0.0303 0.8980 
2.3 0.2787 0.0000 0.0902 0.7886 -0.0503 0.9163 
2.4 0.3856 0.0000 0.0709 0.8044 -0.0681 0.9329 
2.5 0.4968 0.0000 0.0541 0.8203 -0.0862 0.9479 
For Log of Floor Area Productivity
1
 
1.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.5919 0.5919 0.4645 0.7203 
1.1 0.0000 0.0000 0.5410 0.6414 0.4120 0.7721 
1.2 0.0000 0.0000 0.4950 0.6895 0.3626 0.8212 
1.3 0.0000 0.0000 0.4523 0.7318 0.3166 0.8621 
1.4 0.0000 0.0000 0.4116 0.7725 0.2748 0.9009 
1.5 0.0000 0.0000 0.3732 0.8105 0.2324 0.9358 
1.6 0.0001 0.0000 0.3382 0.8447 0.1959 0.9702 
1.7 0.0004 0.0000 0.3041 0.8745 0.1617 1.0022 
1.8 0.0013 0.0000 0.2729 0.9031 0.1289 1.0350 
1.9 0.0037 0.0000 0.2399 0.9300 0.0991 1.0642 
2.0 0.0091 0.0000 0.2112 0.9539 0.0709 1.0933 
2.1 0.0195 0.0000 0.1857 0.9810 0.0419 1.1190 
2.2 0.0375 0.0000 0.1601 1.0037 0.0139 1.1430 
2.3 0.0654 0.0000 0.1355 1.0270 -0.0125 1.1662 
2.4 0.1051 0.0000 0.1134 1.0497 -0.0397 1.1878 
2.5 0.1572 0.0000 0.0919 1.0706 -0.0624 1.2116 
1
 Results are based on differences between computer adopters and matched non-adopters, using kernel 
(Epanechnikov) matching on propensity scores through Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
2
 p-values and confidence intervals are one-sided and at the 90% level. 
3
 H-L indicates Hodges-Lehmann. 
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Table 8a:  Labor Productivity Outcome Equation - MLE for Self-Selection Model 
 
All Stores-I All Stores-II Larger Stores Smaller Stores 
Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Productivity enhancing technology adoptions 
  
      Computer 0.464*** 0.066 0.471*** 0.074 0.517*** 0.142 0.454*** 0.206 
Generator 0.524** 0.237 0.537** 0.224 0.473** 0.216 0.544** 0.267 
Store characteristics         
Store size 0.223*** 0.075 0.224*** 0.076 0.230** 0.095 0.213*** 0.074 
Store age -0.065 0.141 -0.082 0.124 -0.094 -0.066 -0.075 0.061 
Store management & ownership characteristics         
Manager experience 0.126*** 0.046 0.135*** 0.046 0.138*** 0.060 0.108*** 0.041 
Ownership concentration -0.006*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.002 -0.006** -0.003 -0.007** 0.003 
Government owned 0.475 0.319 0.465 0.310 0.686 0.501 0.385 0.335 
Finance, in-store security and competitive factors         
Bank account 0.306*** 0.079 0.317*** 0.066 0.368*** 0.097 0.283** 0.118 
Overdraft facility 0.407** 0.196 0.389** 0.183 0.415** 0.187 0.370** 0.176 
In-store security 0.328** 0.151 0.334** 0.151 0.343*** 0.097 0.326*** 0.122 
Price competition level 0.077 0.066 0.077 0.059 0.122 0.088 0.067 0.114 
Inventory level for main product 0.005*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.002 
State level educational factor         
Literacy rate -- -- 0.019* 0.010 0.020* 0.010 0.020** 0.009 
Fixed effects Store type and State Store type and City Store type and City Store type and City 
Observations 1501 1501 734 767 
Model statistics
1
 LL= - 2566.28 LL= - 2494.92 LL= - 1272.86 LL = - 1350.32 
 Chi2 = 524.7 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 660.6 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 550.2 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 400.6 (p =0.00) 
  Rho = - 0.44  Rho = - 0.46  Rho = - 0.51    Rho = - 0.42 
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. Standard errors are based on clustering – at city level for models with state fixed effects and at state level for models with no 
state fixed effects. 
1 
Rho denotes the correlation in error terms between the outcome (productivity) and the selection (computer adoption) equations.  
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Table 8b. Business Computer Adoption Selection Equation - MLE for Self-Selection Model 
 
All Stores-I All Stores-II Larger Stores Smaller Stores 
Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Corruption factors discouraging transparency         
State TI Corruption Index -- -- -0.110*** 0.036 -0.116*** 0.037 -0.093*** 0.028 
Percent revenue spent on bribe -0.028* 0.014 -0.024* 0.012 -0.026** 0.013 -0.019* 0.011 
Perceived informality by peers -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.002 -0.002*** 0.001 
Enforcement factors encouraging transparency         
Regulatory inspections 0.040*** 0.016 0.041*** 0.013 0.048*** 0.014 0.025*** 0.008 
External auditor 0.274*** 0.095 0.278*** 0.099 0.236*** 0.082 0.304*** 0.104 
Regulatory consistency -- -- 0.025** 0.012 0.024** 0.012 0.026** 0.013 
Labor cost and education level         
State minimum wages -- -- 0.021** 0.011 0.022** 0.011 0.015** 0.007 
State literacy rate -- -- 0.065* 0.036 0.067* 0.036 0.062** 0.029 
Electric power supply related factors         
Power outage -0.063 0.102 -0.067 0.117 -0.077 0.108 -0.063 0.098 
State power supply problem -- -- -0.081 0.056 -0.084 0.059 -0.074 0.061 
Productivity enhancing technology adoptions         
Generator 0.406*** 0.125 0.398*** 0.117 0.491*** 0.139 0.519*** 0.148 
Store level performance measure         
Gross annual revenue 0.093*** 0.008 0.095*** 0.007 0.087*** 0.006 0.133*** 0.014 
Store characteristics         
Store size 0.291*** 0.063 0.299*** 0.064 0.274*** 0.055 0.353** 0.168 
Employee size 0.239*** 0.038 0.235*** 0.038 0.268*** 0.041 0.196*** 0.019 
Store age -0.086** 0.042 -0.091** 0.045 -0.108** 0.051 -0.088** 0.042 
Store management & ownership characteristics         
Manager experience -0.146* 0.070 -0.140* 0.075 -0.177** 0.089 -0.127* 0.068 
Ownership concentration -0.009 0.006 -0.011* 0.006 -0.010* 0.006 -0.008* 0.005 
Government owned -0.322 0.223 -0.336 0.237 -0.532 0.409 -0.197 0.768 
Fixed effects Store type and State Store type and City Store type and City Store type and City 
Observations 1501 1501 734 767 
Model statistics LL= - 2566.09 LL=- 2494.94 LL=- 1272.88 LL = - 1350.33 
  Chi2 = 524.8 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 660.6 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 550.2 (p =0.00) Chi2 = 400.6 (p =0.00) 




Table 8c. Floor Area Productivity Outcome Equation - MLE for Self-Selection Model 
 
All Stores-I All Stores-II Larger Stores Smaller Stores 
Variables Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Productivity enhancing technology adoptions 
  
      Computer 0.538*** 0.105 0.543*** 0.103 0.566*** 0.056 0.523*** 0.082 
Generator 0.410** 0.178 0.418** 0.188 0.394** 0.163 0.440** 0.195 
Store characteristics         
Store size -0.065*** 0.015 -0.061*** 0.012 -0.066*** 0.022 -0.059*** 0.010 
Store age 0.142** 0.063 0.147** 0.063 0.204*** 0.077 0.143** 0.070 
Store management & ownership characteristics         
Manager experience 0.175** 0.076 0.176** 0.076 0.214*** 0.070 0.165*** 0.052 
Ownership concentration -0.005** 0.002 -0.005** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.003 -0.005* 0.003 
Government owned 0.361 0.356 0.337 0.343 0.307 0.394 0.363 0.272 
Finance, in-store security and competitive factors         
Bank account 0.342*** 0.083 0.335*** 0.082 0.448*** 0.116 0.314** 0.138 
Overdraft facility 0.143* 0.075 0.137* 0.073 0.161* 0.091 0.059* 0.034 
In-store security 0.206*** 0.078 0.208*** 0.076 0.251*** 0.095 0.204** 0.092 
Price competition level 0.074 0.067 0.076 0.065 0.076 0.087 0.000 0.089 
Inventory level for main product 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.003** 0.001 
State level educational factor         
Literacy rate -- -- 0.022** 0.011 0.025* 0.013 0.023** 0.010 
Fixed effects Store type and State Store type and City Store type and City Store type and City 
Observations 1501 1501 734 767 
Model statistics
1
 LL = -2561.36 LL = -2595.52 LL = -1362.07 LL = -1452.27 
 
Chi2= 710.83 (p =0.00) 
Rho = - 0.46  
Chi2= 739.04 (p =0.00) 
Rho = - 0.49  
Chi2= 670.02 (p =0.00) 
Rho = - 0.53   
Chi2= 450.69 (p =0.00) 
Rho = - 0.46   
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. Standard errors are based on clustering – at city level for models with state fixed effects and at state level for models with no 
state fixed effects. 
 
1 
Rho denotes the correlation in error terms between the respective productivity and the selection regression equations. 
Results for the computer adoption equation with the floor area productivity outcome equation are not shown to conserve space; the estimates are 














Labor Floor Labor Floor Labor Floor 
All 1.251 1.296 1.505 1.696 1.602 1.721 
Large 1.288 1.305 1.519 1.745 1.677 1.761 
Small 1.241 1.280 1.443 1.694 1.575 1.687 
1
The productivity effects are obtained by taking the exponential of the parameter estimates in the respective tables 
since productivity enters in logs as dependent variables in the regression. For example, consider the effects on labor 
productivity from all store analysis results. For OLS, from Table 4a, exp(0.224)=1.251; for propensity score 
matching from Table 6, exp(.409)=1.505; and for self-selection model from Table 8a column 2, exp(.471)=1.602. 
 
